Program

Monday, August 29

09.00 Welcome

09.00 Paul Milgrom (Stanford), Auctions and Pricing in Markets with Complex Constraints

09.50 Leslie Marx (Duke), Prior-Free Asymptotically Optimal Clock Auctions

10.40 Coffee

11.10 Martin Bichler (TUM), Biding Strategies in Combinational Procurement Auctions with Diseconomies of Scale

12.00 Bernhard Kasberger (University of Vienna), On the Clock of the Cominatorial Clock Auction

12.50 Lunch

14.30 Oleg Baranov (Colorado), Dynamic Vickrey Pricing in Spectrum Auctions

15.20 Achim Wambach (ZEW Mannheim), Constraints on matching markets based on moral concerns

16.10 Tea

16.40 Vitali Gretschko (ZEW Mannheim), Robust Bidding

17.30 Karl Schlag (University of Vienna), Robust Bidding in First Price Auctions: Protecting against False Beliefs

19.00 Workshop Dinner

Tuesday, August 30

09.00 Peter Cramton (EUI Florence, University of Cologne), An Open Access Wireless Market

09.50 Simon Loertscher (University of Melbourne), Estimation-Based Tatonnement in Double-Clock, Dominant-Strategy, Auction Mechanisms

10.40 Coffee

11.10 David Salant (Toulouse), Auctions for upstream inputs

12.00 Sergei Izmalkov (NES, Moscow), Position auctions with endogenous supply

12.50 Lunch

14.30 Nils-Henrik von der Fehr (University of Oslo), Market Time Unit

15.20 Justin Burkett (Wake Forest), Equilibrium in a Uniform-Price Auction with Private Values

16.10 Tea

16.40 Larry Ausubel (Maryland), Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns

19.00 Heuriger